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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Fellowship Grants Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
The predictability of the tax status of grants for educational purposes was
an area of great uncertainty under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. That
Act contained no specific provision for such grants, and so amounts received
under fellowship arid scholarship nomenclature were considered as part of the
recipient's gross income, except as they qualified as gifts.' To so qualify, the
intent of the donor must have been to make a gift2 for the training and educa-
tion of the individual only.3 If the recipient was obliged or expe'ted to use his
knowledge or skill in developing some particular project which benefited the
grantor in some manner, the funds received were held to be consideration for
the services of the recipient to the grantor.4
The Treasury position on the matter was summarized in a communication
in 195 1.r If a grant or fellowship was made for the training and education of
an individual, either as part of his program in acquiring a degree or in other-
wise furthering his educational development, no services being rendered as a
consideration therefor, the amount of the grant was a gift, excludable from
gross income. The Treasury statement continued, however, that if the recipient
applied his skill and training to advance research, creative work, or some other
project or activity, the essential elements of a gift were not present and the
amount received was to be included in gross income. As a consequence of this
Treasury position, if a student performed any services in connection with his
educational development, while receiving funds from an institution, the amount
thereof was likely to be deemed part of gross income by the Commissioner and
the burden of showing it to be a gift would be on the student.0 To make this
showing was an almost insurmountable task, for the slightest indication was
enough for the courts to find an employment relation between the student and
his grantor and sustain the Commissioner's position.7 Such a relation was con-
sidered established if: letters of appointment did not show a donative intent,
the grantor controlled the recipient's research or required periodic reports there-
on, the object of the research was specified by the grantor, the grantor with-
held tax on the payments to the recipient, or the end of the research was of
practical or commercial application.
8
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §22(b)(3). This section was substantially the
same as the present section 102 of the 1954 Code, which specifically excludes
from gross income property received as a gift.
2. George W. Stone, Jr., 23 T.C. 254 (1954).
3. R. F. Doerge, 11 T.C.Memo. 475 (1952); Ti Li Loo, 22 T.C. 220 (1954).
4. Ephriam Banks, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952).
5. I.T. 4056, 1951-2 Cum BULL. 8.
6. Huberman, Scholarships, Fellowships and Prizes, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 116
(1952).




Thus it was that Congress was pressed to specify, for the first time, what
it intended to include of educational grants in the gross income of the recip-
ient. In the general revision of the internal revenue laws in 1954, that specifi-
cation was made, through Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.9
The section generally provides that all amounts received as scholarships and
fellowship grants, including services and accommodations received in kind, are
excluded from the gross income of the recipient.' 0 A limit on the amount of
the exclusion is set by distinguishing between degree and non-degree candi-
dates, and the source of the grant." Those seeking a degree from an educa-
tional institution, as defined by Section 151 (e) (4) of the Code,'2 are entitled
to exclude the entire amount of their grant and, with respect to such persons,
Congress has specified that amounts received as payment for teaching, research,
or other services are within the meaning of fellowships and scholarships if
they are required of all candidates for the degree, whether or not they are re-
cipients of grants.' 3 In order for a non-degree seeking recipient to exclude his
grant from gross income, the grantor must be a tax-exempt organization as de-
scribed in Section 501(c) (3),14 and he can exclude only an amount equal to
$300 per month for the taxable year involved, not exceeding a maximum of
thirty-six months.15 No specification of the construction to be placed upon pay-
ments when services are required as part of the course or curriculum is made
in respect to non-degree candidates.
Although Congress had declared that fellowships and scholarships were
to be excluded from gross income according to the limitations prescribed in
the Code, it had not distinguished between educational grants and compensa-
tion for purposes of the exclusion, except as to services required for degrees.
The aura of uncertainty continued as to that distinction, especially in rega d
to non-degree seeking recipients of grants. Such was the setting when the Tax
Court was presented with just that question in May, 1958, in the case of
9. The words of the Senate and House Committees, describing the Fellow-
ship and Scholarship grants are substantially codified in the section itself. 3
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4823, 5286 (1954). See Landman, The Taxability
of Fringe Benefits, 33 TAXES 173 (1955); see also 7 SYRAcuse L. REV. 130 (1956).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §117(a).
11. Id. §117(b).
12. A qualifying institution under this section is one which normally main-
tains a regular faculty and established curriculum, and normally has a regu-
larly organized body of students in attendance at the place where its educa-
tional activities are carried on. Generally, it includes colleges and universities.
Treas. Reg. §1.117-3(c) (1956).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §117(b) (1).
14. Id. §117(b) (2) (A). Section 501(c)(3) generally exempts corporations
formed exclusively for educational purposes from income taxation. To gain
this exemption, however, the institution must file appropriate papers with its
district director (Treas. Reg. §1.501(a)(2)), not be a "feeder" organization for
a profit-making concern (1954 CODE, §502), refrain from certain "prohibited"
activities (1954 CODE, §503), and not unreasonably accumulate or improperly
use its income (1954 CODE, §504).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §117(b) (2) (B).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Wrobleski v. Bingler.'0 The taxpayer, a graduate physician, was one of a num-
ber of participants in a graduate course leading to a certificate in psychiatry
from the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. He initiated the ac-
tion, seeking a refund of taxes withheld from his stipend. As a requirement of
this course, the participants performed certain clinical services and the taxpay-
er was one of a limited number of the participants who performed that obli-
gation at the University of Pittsburgh Clinic. The Clinic was specially designed
to provide this training, accepting only selected cases.
After finding that Wrobleski was not a candidate for degree" and that
the University of Pittsburgh was a tax-exempt organization," the Court faced
the question of whether the stipend of $3,400 was a fellowship or a salary.
Ruling in favor of the taxpayer, over the Commissioner's argument that the
stipend was payment for treating and counseling patients at the clinic, the
Court made its determination by looking to the primary purpose of the grant.
It held that all monies received by the taxpayer, called a "fellow", constituted
a fellowship grant under Section 117, for the services performed were not for
the grantor but for the primary purpose of furthering the education of the
grantee. Wrobleski's stipend, then, was an allowable exclusion from gross in-
come subject to the limitations on non-degree candidates.
Prior to the decision in the Wrobleski case, the Treasury had been em-
ploying the primary purpose test in making informal determinations of the
nature of educational grants. The Treasury Regulations defined a fellowship
grant as any amount paid or allowed for the benefit of an individual to aid him
in the pursuit of study or research, including the value of contributed services,
tuition, matriculation, and other fees.' Certain payments and allowances are
excluded under the regulations, however, when they may be viewed as payment
for past, present, or future services, or for study or research primarily for the
benefit of the grantor.20 On the other hand, where the primary purpose of the
grant is to further the education and training of the recipient in his individual
capacity and no employment relation is established with respect to the partic-
ular grant, the funds will qualify under Section 117, notwithstanding that the
grantor receives some incidental benefit, or that periodic reports are required.2 '
Using these guides of the regulations, the Treasury, considering "Trainee-
ships" awarded nursing students under the Public Health Service Program,
16. 58-2 U.S.T.C. -, 161 Fed. Supp. 901 (1958).
17. Treas. Reg. §1.117-3(e)(1956) provides that a candidate for degree is
an individual, undergraduate or graduate, who is pursuing studies or conducting
research to meet the requirements for an academic or professional degree con-
ferred by colleges or universities. [Italics supplied.]
18. Within the meaning of §501(c) (3), note 12 supra.
19. Treas. Reg. §1.117-3(c) (1956).
20. Id., §1.117-4(c) (1),(2) (1956).
21. Id., §1.117-4(c) (2) (1956).
RECENT DECISIONS
held that awards from the university participating in the program were exclud-
able from gross income in amounts dependent upon whether the trainee w-.s
a degree candidate or not, although a period of work in a local hospital, whence
it received benefit, was required. 22 The contrast was made when the same prin-
ciples were applied to the stipend of interns and resident physicians from a
hospital for work done therein and required prior to being admitted to prac-
tice. That stipend was held by the Treasury to be a salary, for the primary ben-
efit of the services was for the hospital with only incidental benefits to the in-
tern.23 Similarly, amounts received by students of a theological seminary from
a parish congregation to which they were assigned as a requirement for ordina-
tion, were ruled includible in their gross income.
2 4
Although the line between the Wrobleski case and that of the interns seems
fine at best, the situations appear to have been distinguished on the ground,
less clearly enunciated by the court than the primary purpose rationale, that
no salaried personnel would have been required to replace Wrobleski in the
event he ceased his service, while the same cannot be said of hospital interns
or residents. The decision in the Wrobleski case does not come as a surprise to
students of the 1954 Code. If the case is of any moment, it is because it is the
first clear statement by the Tax Court of what observers, including the Treas-
ury, believed to have been the design of Congress in enacting the special
provision of the Code in regard to scholarships and fellowship awards. Where
a student and his grantor qualify as perscribed by the Code, the fact that the
student performs some services of benefit to the grantor in connection with
his grant is no longer the crucial determinant of the nature -of his stipend, but
merely has weight as evidence on the question of the primary purpose of the
grant. The result reached in the Wrobleski case would almost certainly not have
been reached under the 1939 Code. Since the student did perform clinical serv-
ices under the grantbr's supervision and taxes were withheld from his stipend,
the courts, under the earlier act, would have had little choice but to find the
existence of an employment relation, negating the donative intent there re-
quired.2 5 At least to this extent, prospective scholars and grantors may now
proceed with greater certainty in grants aiding higher education.
Eugene Salisbury
22. RE v. RUL. 57-370, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 105.
23. REV. RUL. 57-386, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 107.
24. RE V. RUL. 57-522, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 50.
25. Supra, notes 1, 2, and 3.
